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Most Art Therapists and Art Psychotherapists have a belief in the healing qualities of the 
media. It is a shared article of faith that creative material processes, of themselves, can 
promote the development of health and stability. Nevertheless, we also know that the 
relation to the material element is not without hazard. This is a problem for us, I think, 
because we can never be certain about the relationship between a service user, or client, 
and the physical material she manipulates. In terms of the relation that the other has to 
substance and process, we are always on the outside.   
 
This book by Jussi A. Saarinen, who is a psychologist and a post-doctoral researcher in 
philosophy, explores the painter’s relationship to painting, the ‘experience itself’ (2021: 1. 
italics the author). Saarinen stresses that he is not concerned with expression but with 
what painters feel ‘because they paint’ (2021:1). His book is essentially a carefully 
constructed argument, which engages with philosophical literatures, psychoanalysis, 
recent cognitive theory and interviews with artists, in support of the proposition that: 
“Painters paint to feel.” (2021: 1.  Italics the author).   
 
I was keen to read this book for two reasons, firstly, to question my understanding of 
feeling, affect, and emotion in relation to painting, and secondly, to explore frames, 
philosophical and psychological, that might help in thinking about the problematic outlined 
in paragraph 1 above.  
 
A Theory of Mind  
Saarinen references recent literature which explores environmental resources that impact 
on, and facilitate, feeling and thinking;  for example, the theory  of ‘scaffolding’ is intended 
to show how people, things, physical spaces etc. ‘are used to elicit, regulate, and augment 
our affects, cognitions, and actions’ (2021:3). The argument of the philosophers here is 
that we create ‘niches’ in the cultural, social and material environment, to ‘scaffold’ our 
minds.  
 
I think that we should note that these ideas are not entirely new. The intellectualist view 
of mind, a view which stresses the internal movement of representations and the 
production of propositional material prior to action in the world, although widespread, has 
been previously criticised, not least by phenomenologists. Ryle (1949) sees the 
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‘intellectual view’ as leading to continuous circular reasoning. This position has been 
supported by other philosophers. Noe (2009) for instance, critiques the assumptions of 
the intellectualist view which suggests that all human agency requires planning and 
control. Not every motor action is pre-planned according to some goal, but rather is 
generated and supported in the environment in which mind is embedded.   
 
The idea of the mind as embedded and/or extended has been developed by cognitive 
psychologists who have been interested in the hand (see Zdravko, 2013). Raymond Tallis 
writes: ‘The hand knows and the hand communicates….. it is an organ of exploration and 
cognition in its own right’ (Tallis, 2003: 28 & 31). In anthropology also, arguments in favour 
of locating mind in the cultural and social environment, exist. For instance, Geertz (1993) 
argues that ‘thinking is primarily an overt act conducted in terms of the objective materials 
of the common culture’ and mental processes are situated, they have their place ‘at the 
scholars desk or the football field, in the studio or lorry-driver’s seat…’ (Geertz, 1993:83). 
We should notice the word ‘studio’ here.  
 
Saarinen writes ‘Mental processes are fundamentally co determined by the 
circumstances and environmental context in which they occur’ (2021:14) and he argues 
that the environment becomes ‘ontologically constitutive’ (2021:18) of affective states.  
This seems to me somewhat stronger than ‘scaffolding’ and the creation of a ‘niche’, 
would suggest.  
 
Painting as resource 
In relation to thinking and the constitution of mind, what properties and resource does 
painting offer? There are the obvious material resources, substances and tools, that 
provide what Saarinen calls ‘concrete scaffolding’ (2021:19), and there is also the 
temporal aspect. There is past painting, a tradition that the artist absorbs and which 
prepares her to paint.  There is the more immediate engagement in making marks and 
responding to marks. Here there is a reciprocity and the painting can be ‘experienced as 
an interlocutor’ (2021:23).  Trust, the ‘reliability of a given environment is important 
Saarinen stresses, and paintings and painting, are arguably, ‘sufficiently dependable 
resources for affective states’ (2021:25).  The painting environment is customized by 
painters and there is an ‘integration’ and “entrenchment” of tools and instruments into the 
‘affective landscape’ of the individual. Here we might think of the studio as a material 
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situation and as an affective world, in which mind is activated and shaped, and there is a 
strong argument for this in the art therapy literature, (Fenner, 2019) for example.  
 
Saarinen quotes the painter Maisa Kela: 
 
‘Instead of talking with a therapist, you converse with a picture. The painting process… 
gives you new insight about yourself’ (Huttula, 2017:163) – Saarinen’s translation 
2021:27) 
 
Conscious intent is not necessary in relation to accessing painting as affective scaffolding. 
What makes painting special, Saarinen argues, is that the scaffoldings supplied by 
painting ‘are in the process of being created by the agent whose affects they scaffold’  
(2021:28 – italics the author).   
 
Psychoanalysis – Object Relations  
In chapter three, Saarinen turns to psychoanalysis. He wishes to show that the 
‘scaffolding’ for thinking that painting offers ‘are organised by earlier object relations’ 
(2021:30). He proposes that existential core concerns present in early infancy can be 
linked to the painting process, for example, the distinction between ‘me and not-me’ 
(Winnicott 1971) between subjective and objective realities, the differences between 
separation and connection, and the feeling that comes with being fully alive.   
 
Saarinen recognises that reciprocity in relation to the caregiver is important where 
emphasis is given to ‘what the mother provides and what the child might conceive of 
(Winnicott 1971:12). Winnicott’s thinking, especially in relation to environmental provision 
and context, Saarinen proposes, is entirely explicable within the ‘niche 
construction/scaffolding framework’ and he endeavours to demonstrate that as ‘playing 
and creative relating’ becomes ‘sophisticated’, ‘Slowly but surely, niche construction 
expands, diversifies and becomes experientially more enriching’ (2021:41).  
 
In enlarging his thinking about the artist’s relation to painting, Saarinen explores mirroring 
via Wright (2009), and attunement via Stern (1985). Referencing Wright, Saarinen 
suggests that the care-giver’s face provides ‘a responsive medium’ for the infant, from 
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which the infant can retrieve ‘significant forms of his own experience’ Wright (2009) :  142-
145 italics the author).    
 
Stern’s interest is in the manner in which the ‘infant’s subjective state’ is ‘recast’ by the 
caregiver (Saarinen 2021:46). The caregiver transforms the infant’s experience, providing 
variety, fresh pattern and rhythm. Wright argues that when painting, the artist’s emotional 
life is given form in an ‘objective medium’ and just as infant experiences in relation to the 
caregiver ‘bring the self into being’, the artist attempts to ‘bring his own self into being 
through creative work’ (Wright:153-154 italics the author).  Much of this theory is also 
familiar to art psychotherapists, especially those working with infants and caregivers 
(Meyerowistz-Katz and Reddick 2017).  
 
Saarinen raises questions about Wright’s approach, suggesting for instance, that artist’s 
do not always concern themselves with the ‘affective elements of experience’ (2021:47 
italics the author). He suggests that whilst it may be that a painting can function ‘in a 
similar way’ to the ‘Mother’s expressive face’ (Wright 2009:13) this does not necessarily 
confirm that painting experiences, in the adult world, are derivative of infant caregiver 
relations. In painting, Saarinen stresses, ‘novel and desirable affects’ are generated, 
feelings emerge that did not have a previous existence in ‘inner affective states’ (2021:51-
52). 
 
The Pygmalion Myth 
Paintings, can be experienced as ‘alive’, they exhibit a vitality, Saarinen suggests, 
(2021:53) and he quotes three painters: 
 
‘My paintings become creature-like…. Each painting grows to be an individual…… a 
breathing body ….. I see my paintings as collaborators.’ (Olli Piippo – Saarinen 2021:53, 
and 2019)  
 
‘there is nothing but a helpless mark on the canvas.  It’s like a child trying to utter its first 
word…’  (Juhana Blomstedt - Jaameri, 2007 Saarinen’s translation) 
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‘Even if a space seems empty, it always has a sense of presence. I paint in order to 
discover that distinct presence …’ (Susann Gottberg -The third factor exhibition text 
Kunsthalle Helsinki, 1 June to 4 August 2019).  
 
Two elements are stressed in this idea. Paintings can be experienced as ‘organic’ living 
entities that develop and change, and paintings can have agency, they become 
‘autonomous contributers’ to a process (2021: P54 italics the author).   
 
Three factors contribute to this ‘aliveness of paintings’ argues Saarinen. Firstly, there are 
‘cultural and discursive’ factors which support ‘animistic and anthropomorphic’ accounts 
of painting. Secondly there is the individual artist’s ‘vitalistic fantasies’, and ‘unconscious 
factors’, ‘rooted in early dyadic relations’ (2021: 54 italics the author).  Thirdly there are 
particular ‘material and metamorphic’ factors that give painting life, or vitality (2021:55 - 
italics the author).   
 
Since we first relate to another person the suggestion is, and here Saarinen quotes 
Marion Milner, ‘the adult painter could be basically, even though unconsciously, 
concerned with an animistically conceived world’ (Milner 1957:116). The ‘vitalistic 
phantasy is a potentiality’ which requires particular conditions ‘if it is to be triggered’ 
(Saarinen 2021:59 author’s italics). With this phantasy expectations arise, there is an 
expectation of a receptive response from the material engagement. On the ‘darker side’ 
lies an anxiety that the blank unresponsive canvas may not come to life, images may turn 
out dead. Just as with any relationship there is an element of unpredictability.  
 
Saarinen explores the material nature of painting and refers to Elikins. Elkins emphasises 
the ‘realm of the viscous, the gluey’, where paint is seen as a substance that mimics ‘life 
by shining, gleaming, catching the eye’ (Elkins, 2000:166,167,143).  Ingredients can then 
be regarded as half-alive, there is a potential in the ‘tangible material qualities of the paints 
themselves’ (Saarinen 2021:64 authors italics).     
 
Saarinen briefly explores the history of the Pygmalion myth and he observes that some 
painters attempt to escape the subjective through the application of mechanistic and 
random production processes, for example Gerhard Richter, and in doing so demonstrate 
the paintings ‘self-agency’. Such methodologies impact on the experiences of other 
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artists. It is experience that explains the persistence of the Pygmalion trope, according to 
Saarinen, a ‘collectively accumulated experience’ which painters can relate to because 
of their own ‘painterly practice’. (2021:57).    
 
I think it should be noted that painters did, and still can, use very conventional rule- based 
approaches to the production of imagery. This could be regarded as a way of disciplining 
the media and over-determining the changes that take place. But painters often allow 
their paints to ‘behave more freely’. Expressionists and other modern and contemporary 
painters, by deliberately loosening control, experience the growth of their work as 
‘organic’. We could say that the Pygmalion myth is sustained by modernist discourses 
and practices and the statements of artists, and of critics, disclose this cultural context. 
 
Elkins suggests that painters have to ‘toy with death, to bring the paint close to the point 
of no return’ (Elkins 2000:143). This would indicate that aggression has a role in painting 
and in making, and such a view accords with Kleinian approaches to art.  For example, 
Klein writes: ‘conflict, and the need to overcome it is a fundamental element in 
creativeness’ (Klein, 1988 (1957):186).   
 
Saarinen does not explore Kleinian ideas, instead, he next turns to Bollas’ notion of the 
‘transformational object’: 
 
to seek the transformational object is really to recollect an early object experience, to 
remember not cognitively, but existentially through intense affective experience, a 
relationship that was identified with cumulative transformational experiences of the self. 
(Bollas, 2018:91).    
 
Bollas’s view is reminiscent of Wright’s ideas concerning mirroring. In response to Bollas, 
Saarinen suggests that there is a need for painters to ‘enliven and advance the creative 
process’….. ‘so that they themselves can feel alive’, and painting provides the scaffolding 
that may not be attainable elsewhere (Saarinen 2021:71 italics the author). 
 
The Oceanic Feeling 
So far, the painting has been considered as an object apart from the painter who is 
enlivened by the dialogue with this as-if alive object. However, when we take up paint 
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with the brush, or other implement, and apply it to a surface, our consciousness is 
focussed on the paint and its movement over a surface, of resistance and of a flowing, or 
of a clotting and sticky, substance. The sensitive transmission of sensation via brush, 
fingers and hand brings us in contact with the paint, and the surface to which it is applied, 
in such a way as to channel consciousness and encourage a union, a lack of separation. 
Consciousness of self falls away in our absorption in the phenomenology of painting.  
Saarinen suggests this bodily absorption can be experienced as a submersion. Here he 
quotes the painter Stephen Newton who describes ‘a peculiar sensation of envelopment 
… a total engulfment’ (Newton, 2008:47).  Krausz,. a philosopher and a painter, suggests 
that, in in this particular affective state, ‘sharp distinctions between binary terms …….. 
self and other, subject and object are undone.’  (Krausz, 2009:194)  
 
Saarinen chooses to explore this experience of ,dissolution and fusion’ under the term 
‘oceanic feeling’ (2021: 75). He reminds us that Freud, in responding to the novelist and 
social critic Romain Rolland, offered an interpretative account of the ‘oceanic feeling’ in 
adult life as a preservation of ‘primary narcissism’, a later version of an original ‘all-
embracing feeling’ experienced in infant-mother unity (Saarinen 2021:76).  The ‘oceanic 
feeling’, which was initially seen as defensive, was the subject of debate in psychoanalytic 
and developmental literatures. Was there a union of a symbiotic kind in neo-natal life, or 
was the infant capable of distinguishing the not-me from the me at the beginning?   
 
Saarinen draws on some developmental debate, and in support of his Winnicottian 
sympathies, he suggests that both extremes of separation and union can be experienced 
in early infancy and ‘self-other boundaries’ may be experienced as ‘fluid’ . The adult 
experience of the oceanic, Saarinen proposes, arises from a more sensorial  or receptive 
‘mode of mentation’ as opposed to a more ‘active and differentiated’ mental mode (2021: 
81 and 84) .  
 
But what is the value of the ‘oceanic feeling’?  Saarinen’s brief review of the literature 
which explores this question, would indicate that it might have both positive and negative 
value, dependent on context. Are states of union representative of some moment of ‘pure 
creativity’ or does the state inhibit critical attention to activity (Krausz 2009)?  Saarinen 
suggests that there is a special interactive state, between painter and painting, where 
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conscious and deliberate action is lost to awareness, but where activity is still present and 
effective. This might be contrasted with a later critically evaluative reflection.    
 
Saarinen refers to Ehrenzweig (1967), who argues that ‘depth level’perception is essential 
to art making since it subverts the tendency to ‘see things in terms of separation and 
opposites’, and it disrupts ‘the fixity and rigidity of habitual surface perception’ (Saarinen 
2021:92,93). By giving way to the ‘pull of the deep’ as, Ehrenzweig (1967:196) proposes, 
limits are transcended and discoveries are made, in  terms of form and vitality.   
 
But Ehrenzweig (1967) does also suggest that art-making requires an ‘oscillation’ 
between the ‘differentiated surface level’ attention, and the ‘dedifferentiated depth-level’ 
form.  Milner (1987), following Ehrenzweig, refers to the mind’s ‘porpoise-like movement’ 
(1987:242). Saarinen argues that this should be understood as the co-existence of two 
‘moods’ where each form of perception compliments the other and contributes to the 
creative work.  However, it is also suggested that the oceanic feeling that arises with 
‘depth-level’ perception can engender a range of feeling, including ‘considerable anxiety’ 
(2021:97). In ‘manic-oceanic’ states, grandiosity and omnipotence in relation to art 
making may make an appearance (2021:98,99).    
 
For some painters, Saarinen concludes, the oceanic experience, may result in a 
‘broadening’ of  ‘perceptual and aesthetic sensibilities’ to the benefit of their painting.    
 
I was surprised that Saarinen did not discuss consciousness, or reference 
phenomenology, in this part of his book. We are not always fully conscious of ourselves 
when engaged in activities, and we surely lose such consciousness when there is intense 
focus, whether narrow or dispersed. Sartre (1956) has argued for the recognition of an 
unreflective consciousness and maybe these intense states are not so unusual when we 
are fully absorbed and committed to the material and equipment of our projects (see for 
example, Csikszentruihalyi, 1990).  
 
The Feeling of Rightness 
Painters often report on the feeling that they have got ‘it’ right.  Agnes Martin for instance; 
‘when you finally paint what you’re supposed to paint, then something tells you “OK, this 
is it”.’ (Gruen,1991:83, 84 – italics in original)  Richard Diebenkorn asserts; ‘the idea is to 
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get everything right ….everything all at once’(Gruen,1991:63).  The important thing to 
note, suggests Saarinen, is that this rightness, or  awareness of rightness, is a feeling.   
 
What is it in the painting that feels right?  It must be variable since painters paint in 
‘different cultural-historical circumstances’ using a wide range of methodologies.  Feeling 
in respect of ‘rightness’ must be ‘overdetermined’ Saarinen argues, and the grounds that 
might determine ‘rightness’ may shift and develop as work progresses.  If then, there is a 
large diversity of practices what would be the underlining point of reference, to which the 
feeling relates? Saarinen proposes that the basis for this feeling is ‘the artist’s own 
experience’ (2021:103 authors italics).   
 
David Hockney asserts; ‘even if you are dealing with something else, it has to be filtered 
through your own experience and feelings. In that sense it is always autobiographical.’ 
(Cork, 2015:94). Hockney’s view is supported by Michael Craig-Martin; ‘Works of art are 
the products of our attempts to give expressive form to our personal experience of the 
world.’ (Cork, 2015:179).   
 
Both of the above quotations do not help with the identification of the moment when the 
feeling emerges or describe a commonality in the origins of the feeling – beyond 
suggesting that it remains individual. We could well imagine that “rightness” for Hockney 
would be quite a different thing for Craig-Martin. The individual aspect is important to 
Saarinen who proposes that the painting ‘becomes, in Winnicottian parlance, a subjective 
object’, or in Kohut’s terminology a ‘self-object’ (Kohut,  2011 in Saarinen 2021:105 
authors italics). Here the idea of reflection emerges again (see earlier comments on 
mirroring) and painting is then seen as an interaction with a material object that 
reorganises experience.   
 
Saarinen at this point reports that he is limiting his enquiry to painting that encapsulates 
a ‘bi-directional interaction between the painter and the developing work’ (2021:105). A 
process that requires continuous re-adjustment of intentionality as the painting 
progresses. Francis Bacon, for instance, reports;  ‘I have an idea of what I’d like to do, 
but…accidents in the paint suggest the possibilities of developing the image in a way 
which seems very much better than anything I had thought of.’ (Cork, 2015:33).    
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It does appear from the quotations that Saarinen explores, that personal ‘pre-sensing’ or 
‘planning’ does not have particular significance for his approach to painting.  Saarinen 
returns to psychoanalysis, this time drawing on the writings of George Hagman (2005 and 
2010). Essentially Hagman proposes that the painting, when it excites and enlivens the 
artist as ‘self-object’, reflects the ‘shared idealization’ … ‘the thrill of touching and 
vocalizing’ previously present in infant-caregiver interactions. For Hagman, when 
‘subjectivity’ is expressed, the artist then experiences ‘aesthetic resonance’, especially 
when the painting ‘reflects its maker’s subjectivity in both ideal and sufficiently truthful 
form’ (Hagman, 2010:5, 74,79 in Saarinen  2021:115). The process is presented as 
addictive since the artist is in search of an ‘elusive yet powerful affective event’ (Hagman, 
2005:72). Saarinen views this event as a moment of ‘self-discovery’ which enhances the 
feeling of being alive.  
 
The feeling of having got it right, or the desire for getting it right (in the painting) is for 
Saarinen related to a ‘perpetual existential’ concern, to be ‘meaningfully’ connected to a 
world. It is a search for affirmation, ‘what we need and desire most’ (2021:120).  
 
Existential Feeling 
In his explorations in philosophy and psychoanalysis, and in his reading of artists’ 
statements, Saarinen has been in pursuit of the existential. In chapter seven, the last 
chapter in the book, he presents us with his understandings in relation to ‘existential 
feeling’. He achieves this by presenting Marian Milner as a case study.    
 
Saarinen directs the reader towards three themes that emerge from Milner’s engagement 
with painting.   
 
Firstly, the realization that the ,object world’does not accord with our unconscious desires, 
wishes or phantasies, and this disjunction might generate hate.  Disillusionment then 
becomes a developmental necessity enabling the subject to experience objects as 
autonomous, as being real. However, the split that arises between the subjective and 
objective can be restored by painting, according to Milner, through the creation of a 
‘particular kind of new unity’ (Milner 1957:131).    
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Secondly, painting offers an opportunity for the painter to give what fits a perceived ‘gap’.  
Milner argues that artists create their own gaps, determining the size of the gap but also 
deciding what should fill it (Milner 1957:133). 
 
Thirdly, art production is transformative. It enables individuals to discover a fresh self in 
relation to others.  Milner suggests, ‘it is perhaps ourselves that the artist in us is trying to 
create; and if ourselves then also the world’ (Milner 1957:136.)   
 
These identified themes in Milner are then considered by Saarinen under the concept of 
‘existential feeling’ as outlined by Ratcliffe (2013). Ratcliffe develops Heidegger to argue 
that we find ourselves in a world that is given to us. It is given to us through our moods. 
Just as we find ourselves in a world, we find ourselves in moods, moods are not had in 
the same way as emotions or desires. We are immersed in moods which disclose the 
world to us and determine possibilities. They are bodily phenomena through which the 
experiences of objects reach us. These bodily feelings, understood as moods, provide 
the context in which more conscious intentionality develops. 
 
Saarinen is suggesting that Milner, through her experiments with painting, was able to 
register a change in existential mood/feeling to reach beyond her disillusionment and 
become more receptive to outer realities. The therapeutic value of painting then reaches 
beyond the ‘aesthetic’ and opens towards a more extended mind. Milner’s ‘new unity’ is 
a new ground or mood, which creates ‘new gaps’, which then leads towards the creation 
of a new world and self. 
 
Saarinen concludes that painting is able to ‘support the modification and sustenance of 
one’s overall affectively constituted existential orientation’ (2021:139). Existential feeling 
then becomes for Saarinen ‘one of the main objects of artistic creativity’ (2021:139 italics 
the author).   
 
Summary  
Saarinen is concerned with painters who have a commitment to a regular engagement 
with painting. These professional painters who he quotes do differ considerably in their 
practices, consider for example, the contrast between Agnes Martin, David Hockney and 
Francis Bacon. But all have clearly developed their views in a cultural climate which 
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encourages practices where experiment and the expression and exploration of feeling 
are valued, rather than the use of pre-planning and formalized procedures.   
 
There are shared feelings arising from the experience of painting that the painters report 
and Saarinen suggests that these feelings can be understood through the use of 
psychoanalytical thinking, in particular object relations theory. Feelings that are described 
in relation to the experience of painting are then related to early experiences with the 
caregiver. But Saarinen is clear that such feeling is not simply derivative of the early 
experiences. He acknowledges the importance of phantasy and the unconscious, but he 
wants to show that there is something more fundamental which emerges in the practice 
of painting and which generates feeling and emotion in an existential form. This bodily 
existential feeling is part of the earlier emotional experiences with caregivers and it has 
some determinate effect on how the world is encountered. There is something 
phenomenological in respect of painting as a practice that enables this existential mood 
to reach consciousness and Milner’s experiments serve as an exemplar. 
 
An interrogation of how we construct and/or imagine infant experience might be useful 
here, and I would have liked to have seen a more suspicious, and systematic approach 
to the artist’s statements in this book. I think a more discursive study of the artists’ 
language and speech is needed to locate it, more emphatically, in its cultural context. 
 
Much of the literature that Saarinen explores from psychoanalysis and object relations, 
could be thought of as foundational for many practicing art therapists and the move from 
psychoanalysis to existentialism in Saarinen’s thinking should be of interest to art 
therapists.  Everything in his book is carefully argued and that makes it valuable.  But, in 
a way, art therapists have a different problem where understanding how contexts 
influence material engagements, is critical. An exploration of painting as an activity where 
affect is communicated and exchanged with others, is needed, if we are to grasp an 
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